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CASE COMMENT
Hard Times for Bounty Hunters: Zenith Radio
Corporation v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441
(1978)
DWIGHT C. SEELEY*
The long-standing doubts surrounding United States
countervailing duties policy were recently unraveled by the
United States Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corporation v.
United States (98 S.Ct. 2441) (1978). Eight years of adminis-
trative review and judicial interpretation ended in a denial of
Zenith's appeal for countervailing duties to be assessed against
imported Japanese electronic products.'
Zenith, the large Chicago-based electronics firm,' found its
original complaint for assessment of duties denied by the Cus-
toms Bureau of the Treasury Department. The Treasury pol-
icy, backed by some eighty years of administrative precedent,
requires a showing that if a foreign producer rebates taxes or
fails to tax products upon export, then that rebate must be
"excessive," that is, more than the item was initially taxed in
the domestic market. If such a rebate is nonexcessive, then it
fails to provide the exporter an unfair competitive advantage
and therefore will not trigger a countervailing duty against it.
The legislative history, economic theories, and prior Supreme
Court pronouncements advanced by Zenith proved insufficient
to override this longstanding Treasury policy and its reasona-
bleness in light of past and present United States countervail-
ing duty laws. The unanimous Supreme Court opinion conse-
quently upheld the Treasury practice and the economic policy
that it reflects.
* B.A., 1970, University of Wisconsin; J.D. candidate, 1980, University of Denver
College of Law.
1. Television receivers, radio receivers, radio-phonograph combinations, radio-
television-phonograph combinations, radio/tape recorder combinations, tape players,
record players and phonographs complete with amplifiers and speakers, tape recorders,
and parts of television receivers: color television picture tubes, resistors, transformers
(deflection components), and tuners for receivers with integrated circuits. 37 Fed. Reg.
10,087 (1972) as amended by 37 Fed. Reg. 11,487 (1972).
2. Zenith has also been the standard bearer for the industry in litigating dumping
claims against Japanese electronics producers. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251 (1975).
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Background
In the arena of world trade, a manufacturer faced with an
inelastic demand for his product may find that a decrease in
domestic price will not increase demand sufficiently to cover
the loss in revenue of a price decrease. The manufacturer may
well find an elastic demand in a foreign market, where selling
at a lower price will stimulate sales and increase profits as well
as provide him market penetration. By exporting, his "profits
will be maximized by maintaining the high price at home and
selling at a lower price abroad." 3 This is dumping, a practice
which is specifically outlawed in the United States by the Rev-
enue Act of 1916' and the Anti-Dumping Act of 19215 as re-
cently amended by the Trade Act of 1974.
Another practice, sharing an "interlocking conceptual
basis"' with dumping is that of subsidies, usually provided by
a foreign government to promote export. Typically, a govern-
ment makes a political decision to bolster the economic posi-
tion of a particular group of industries. Reasoning for this may
vary. Sometimes the intent is to protect a weak domestic in-
dustry already glutted by competition; at other times the pur-
pose is to protect the domestic economy through increased for-
eign exchange earnings and a stable balance of payment posi-
tion. Whatever the reason and by whatever method the govern-
ment chooses to provide the subsidy, the recipient industry
becomes more competitive in the world market because of the
subsidy and not because it has produced more efficiently.7 The
Countervailing Duties provision of the Tariff Act of 19308 pro-
vides statutory protection for American industries from this
kind of subsidized export. Access to the Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty measures has been expedited through the
recently expanded concept of judicial review of negative deci-
sions,9 resulting in a flurry of legal activity. The dumping stat-
3. See Meyerson, A Review of Current Antidumping Procedures: United States
Law and the Case of Japan, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 168 (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
5. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976).
6. Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax
Adjustments and the Resurgence of Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAw & POL'y INT'L
Bus. 17, 33 (1969).
7. Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Reemerging Issue
in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1968).
8. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. IV 1974).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).
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ute was applied only 77 times between 1954 and 1971, whereas
roughly 65 cases were under review from 1971 to 1974.10 The
major thrust of countervailing duty complaints in the 1960's
was directed against European Economic Community and
Canadian exporters." However, the 1970's have seen Japan as-
sume the position as the leading exponent of dumping. While
countervailing duty determinations have been more infre-
quent, 2 there too the recent activity has concerned Japan, with
the case of Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States 3 provid-
ing the definitive standard for determination of illegal subsi-
dies.
"Japan, Inc."
The pressures of a growing population, racial homogene-
ity, and a capacity for high productivity have created a busi-
ness-image of Japan as a monolith, where government and
industry go hand-in-glove to dominate the world's industries.
This image portrays the government as the economic center or
"home office" with each industry a branch or division of the
corporation. Although this image tends to distort the true pic-
ture, principally by minimizing the private activity of the
major corporations and the considerable competition between
them," there is no arguing that post-war Japan has seen a
remarkable consensus of national goals where business and
government officials have collaborated to promote economic
growth. ,5
With the dismantling of the huge, family-controlled corpo-
rations (the zaibatsu) and the regulation of monopolistic enter-
prises under the Occupation, new and independent business
initiatives arose. From the beginning, post-war growth was
forged by a unique "participatory partnership" where the gov-
ernment defined the economic priorities of the nation, and in-
dustries, assisted by a variety of supports and subsidies, endea-
vored to fulfill them.'" In the 1950's, the Japanese government's
10. Silbiger, Trade Act of 1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practices in
International Trade, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 77, 80 (1975).
11. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 197.
12. Butler, supra note 7, at 126.
13. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
14. E. Kaplan, Japan: The Government-Business Relationship 15 (1972).
15. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 197.
16. E. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 17. The United States Commerce Department
analogizes this relationship as one similar to the American government's creation of
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA). Because the U.S. government desired certain national goals and
1979
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goals centered around the "big four" industries (coal, electric-
ity, marine transportation, and iron and steel) which received
top priority and the largest proportion of investment funds.'7
What emerged from that experiment was a rebuilt economy
and a government-industrial relationship that mutually strives
for what the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) has called a "concerted economy":
Out of discussions between the government and private enter-
prise, mutually determined national targets are worked out. Pri-
vate enterprise pledges to carry these out. Government, on its
side, pledges special favors . . . such as subsidies and taxation
measures. 8
The economic infrastructure, fueled by large scale concessions
from the U.S. military during the Korean and Vietnamese con-
flicts, grew so rapidly that by 1964 the balance of trade between
the United States and Japan shifted in Japan's favor and has
grown every year thereafter, totaling $3 billion in 1971, just
after Zenith filed its complaint. 9
The rapid expansion of the Japanese economy has not
been entirely smooth, however, and the industrial system has
developed in such a fashion that domestic troubles (such as a
recession) will have international repercussions. For one, a high
equity/debt ratio (20.8% versus 44% in the U.S.)20 has put a
continuing burden on Japanese industries. This, combined
with a system of lifetime employment with a variety of em-
ployee benefits, means that Japanese companies have a high
level of fixed costs. These costs encourage a "full capacity pol-
icy," which requires each industry to operate at full capacity
to recover high fixed costs.2' Full capacity results in surplus
production which will find its way abroad as exports.
In times of stress the planned oligopolistic structure func-
tions poorly. Each industry has its ranking within the domestic
economy and will receive its commensurate "market share" in
import licensing and borrowing quotas. In a rapid growth pe-
because of the large amounts of capital, high technology and high risk involved, only
the government could successfully underwrite such projects.
17. Id. at 73, n.11.
18. MITI, Industrial Research Paper #100, "A discussion of Cooperative Industrial
Organization," quoted in E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 398 (1970).
19. E. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 6.
20. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 198.
21. Id. at 198-99.
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riod a given industry will grow and invest in production capac-
ity commensurate to its market share and new enlarged credit
capacity. 2  Overproduction results when the economy falters,
thus:
in times of recession or when overcapacity results from the cor-
poration investing to protect its market share, the excess pro-
duce is sold abroad (even dumped) by the ubiquitous trading
sibling as long as the variable costs are recovered, since high fixed
costs for debt (interest) and wages (life employment) cannot be
avoided anyway.2
Consumer electronics, like coal and shipbuilding in the
1950's, has been deemed a "high priority growth industry 24 in
the 1970's and no industry has been more responsive to the
need for export marketing." This responsiveness has resulted
in a highly defensive stance by various U.S. industries, which
has resulted in increased complaints and litigation. Where the
decade 1960-1970 saw only six dumping cases lodged against
Japan, aggressive sales. have catapulted that figure to thirty-
two complaints during the four years from 1971 to 1975.26 In
that regard "renewed and continued activity may be antici-
pated." 27
The Law
A highly competitive world sugar market aroused the pro-
tective instincts of the U.S. Congress which passed the first
general countervailing duty statute under the Tariff Act of
1897 .2 This act delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the
power to determine the amount of "bounty" or "grant" by
which a foreign government subsidized exports. The Secretary
was required to assess a duty equal to that amount. Subse-
quent enactments in 1909, 1913, and 1930 altered the act only
slightly.
The Countervailing Duty Law as it stands today provides
22. D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 157 (1975).
23. Id.
24. E. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 7.
25. "Hitachi (a major electronics firm) has traditionally placed great emphasis on
the promotion of exports. The future development of the company's business is based
squarely on export, and this policy is in accord with the requirements of the nation as
a whole." (Emphasis added.) (1968 annual report.) Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251, 289 (1975).
26. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 197.
27. Silbiger, supra note 10, at 80.
28. 30 Stat. 205 (1897).
1979
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for the assessment of a special duty on imported merchandise
equal to the net amount of any "bounty or grant" paid
"directly or indirectly" by a foreign government or other entity
with respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation of
such merchandise.2 The administration of section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 lies with the Treasury Department"0 which
delegates its authority to the Commissioner of Customs.3'
Where investigation shows that a "bounty or grant" exists on
dutiable merchandise, the Commissioner is required to assess
a countervailing duty.32
Anyone can invoke the Countervailing Duty Law although
it is a domestic producer who generally initiates the investiga-
tion.u If the Commissioner fails to find a bounty and conse-
quently makes no assessment, the U.S. manufacturer, produ-
cer, or wholesaler may contest the no-bounty determination in
the United States Customs Court.Y Failing there, an appeal
may be filed with the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals,5 and the Supreme Court may grant certior-
ari.3 The impact of the Trade Act of 1974 was to extend to
American manufacturers the right to contest a no-bounty
determination; conversely, foreign producers had rights to a
judicial review of an assessment from section 514 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. 3
Although in existence for better than eighty years, the
Countervailing Duty statute has been difficult to apply. No
statutory language within the law defines what constitutes a
"bounty or grant." Nor do the implementing regulations shed
any light.38 Of the two Supreme Court cases before Zenith
that had taken countervailing duty assessments on review,
39
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976).
30. Except for duty free merchandise which will be reviewed by the International
Trade Commission. The standard applied there is consistent with a dumping stan-
dard-that the item has caused "injury" to a U.S. industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1976).
31. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47 (1977).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
33. W. STERLING & D. WALLACE, A LAwYER's GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusiNESs
TRANSACTIONS 132 (2d ed. 1977).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1976).
38. 19 C.F.R. § 159.41-47 (1977).
39. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); and Nicholas v. United States,
249 U.S. 34 (1919).
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neither had been explicit enough in its definition to provide re-
liable precedent for either subsequent court decisions or com-
mentators." A wealth of legislative history can be called upon
to support either the position that a "bounty" means only an
excessive remission or the contrary position that any remis-
sion constitutes a bounty. Also, the Customs Court in Zenith
v. United States" accepted the Downs holding as a viable
precedent, while the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
with two dissents, ruled to the contrary.
2
The Tax
The difficulty in deciding whether an indirect tax exemp-
tion or remission of the type complained of in the Zenith case
is a bounty or grant lies in the nature of indirect taxes gener-
ally. In Zenith the tax was a "single stage consumption tax'
3
levied on goods at the manufacturing level. The tax emanates
from the Japanese Commodity Tax Law (March 31, 1962, Law
No. 48) which sets a consumer tax on items such as television
sets." It also provides that previously paid taxes on exempt
products (e.g., exports) are refunded.'5 As such it is merely an
excise or consumer-type indirect tax, not unlike those of the
United States, some of which are remitted upon export."
The classical theory of taxation holds that indirect taxes
differ from direct ones in that direct taxes (production and
materials taxes, income taxes, etc.) will be absorbed by the
manufacturer whereas indirect taxes are fully shifted forward
to the consumer in the price of the product. It is thought that
a seller will raise his prices by the equivalent amount of his
indirect tax burden, and the consumer becomes the de facto
taxpayer." If the tax were not rebated on export, the ex-
ported product would be taxed by the exporting country and
40. See e.g., that the Supreme Court definition of "bounty" in the Downs case
is dictum: Butler, supra note 7, at 119; and Feller, supra note 6. But see, e.g., that
the bounty definition is a holding: American Express v. United States, 332 F. Supp.
191, 197-99 (Cust. Ct. 1971); and King, Countervailing Duties-An Old Remedy with
New Appeal, 24 Bus. L. 1179, 1182-83 (1969).
41. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
42. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp. 562 F. 2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
43. 430 F. Supp. at 242.
44. Way, Brockman & Otsuka, 51-6th T.M., Business Operations in Japan A-44
(1978). On television sets the tax is 15%.
45. Id.
46. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4221(a)(2), 6416(b)(2)(A) (1976).
47. Feller, supra note 6, at 51.
1979
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the importing country, making it noncompetitive when mar-
keted against the importing country's product."5 Both the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
Treasury Department/Customs Bureau are apprised of this po-
tential double taxation. Both hold that a countervailing duty
will not be imposed merely because the exporting country has
rebated a domestic tax upon export of the product. In fact, if
the principles of GATT had been applied to the Zenith case,
there would have been no appeal since the statutory language
of GATT (in Article VI(3)) makes it clear that neither the
exemption nor the refund of an indirect tax by the exporting
country will trigger a countervailing duty. " However, Article
II of GATT recognizes the superiority of prior inconsistent
domestic legislation under the protocol arrangement. 0 Thus,
since the Tariff Act's Countervailing Duty provision precedes
GATT, it is the interpretation of that statutory language along
with the Supreme Court decisions that provide the resolution
to the Zenith case.
The above analysis of indirect taxes is no longer absolute
under the modern view, which holds that the forward shifting
on indirect taxes is incomplete. Thus a $100 production-cost
Japanese television which is assessed at 15% tax would sell for
$115 in Japan if the tax were fully shifted forward. However, if
the producer sold the item for $110 in the foreign market, the
$15 he would receive in remitted tax from exporting his product
would be in excess of his indirect tax liability by $5 per unit.
Thus, his exports would be subsidized by the government tax
remission. In response to the above situation, the U.S. position
has been that a countervailing duty will be imposed to the
extent that the rebated, indirect tax is not shifted forward in
the cost of the item. 51
Since Zenith was neither argued from a factual tran-
script,52 nor did it evidence the extent to which the Japanese
tax was shifted, no economic guidelines were set by any of the
48. See generally ExEcuTivE BRANCH GATT SlTrDis, SENATE CoM&rrrFN ON
FINANCE, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1974).
49. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A24, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
50. The "grandfather clause." Protocol of Provisional Application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1(b), 61 Stat. A 2051, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
51. Butler, supra note 7, at 116.
52. The Customs determinations generate no formal hearing record.
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three courts which heard the Zenith case. It is safe to say,
however, that the weight of modem authority supports the
theory that indirect taxes are not fully shifted forward and
direct taxes are not fully shifted backward." To the degree that
an indirect tax is even partially shifted backward (that is, ab-
sorbed by the manufacturer) a full refund of an indirect tax
becomes a subsidy for exports. 54 Also, there is no generally
agreed-upon method for determining the degree of discrimina-
tion that results from this indirect/direct tax problem." Com-
plex economics, coupled with the divergent goals and methods
of economists, have caused the courts to adopt neither of these
competing points of view. This is not to say that the courts are
not aware of these complexities. There are ample indications
that both the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals" and the
Supreme Court" are fully apprised of the negative commentary
directed against the economic principles on which the Treasury
has based its policy.
Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States (430 F. Supp. 242)
(1977)
The Zenith case shows the countervailing duty determi-
nation procedures through each stage of review. Zenith Radio
Company first petitioned the Treasury Department in 1970,
alleging that the remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax (on
various consumer electronic items) constituted a bounty or
grant and asked for an imposition of countervailing duties. The
Customs Bureau began an investigation and solicited informa-
tion from all parties, which ultimately resulted in publication
of preliminary findings on February 5, 1975.58 The notice distin-
guished three export-inducing programs under which "benefits
had been received" which constituted "bounties or grants"
within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act. The Com-
missioner of Customs further stated that the amounts consid-
53. Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjustments: Problems and Proposals, 2 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 85, 109 (1970). See also K. DAM, THE GATT-LAw AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, 214 (1970).
54. Rosendahl, supra note 53, at 110; and K. Dam, supra note 53, at 215.
55. Rosendahl, supra note 53, at 112. See also, McNamara, Tax Adjustments in
International Trade; The Border Tax Dispute, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 339, 361 (1972).
56. 562 F. 2d 1209, 1219 n. 19.
57. 98 S. Ct. 2441, 2449 n, 14.
58. See 37 Fed. Reg. 10,087 (1972) (notice of proceedings) and 40 Fed. Reg. 5,378
(1975) (preliminary determination).
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ered were de minimis, that is, not excessive and therefore not
to be countervailed. Because the program providing the bene-
fits was available to firms capitalized at less than one billion
yen, the Commissioner prolonged the investigation in order to
determine whether "significant" benefits would accrue to a few
smaller firms. On January 7, 1976, a final negative determina-
tion was made.5 The findings showed that two export-inducing
programs had been abandoned by the Japanese government.
The third involved an aggregate amount considered de minimis
per dollar value of the exported product. Thus, no countervail-
ing duty was assessed.
Zenith chose to contest the determination, resulting in a
plea before the Customs Court for a summary judgment on the
matter. 0 Plaintiff Zenith, arguing directly from Downs v.
United States, said that the Supreme Court's decision as well
as that of special customs tribunals had repeatedly held that a
remission of taxes on exportation constituted a bounty or grant.
They buttressed this argument with reference to the legislative
history of section 303. The defendant averred that the counter-
vailing duty provision was intended to apply only to "excessive
remission of taxes directly related to the imported product."'"
Furthermore, because the Congress had been apprised of the
Treasury practice (countervailing only "excessive" remis-
sions), this amounted to a legislative approval of the adminis-
trative practice."
The court found for plaintiff Zenith and ordered the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to assess countervailing duties equal to the
"net amounts of bounty or grant paid or bestowed. '6 3
The court's reading of the 1903 Downs case is at the center
of the argument. In Downs the Supreme Court addressed itself
to a tax rebate on sugar exported from Russia. Exporters were
not only relieved of the 1.75 rubles per pood 4 domestic excise
tax, but received a certificate upon export. This certificate
could then be sold to other sugar producers entitling them to
the same excise rebate on sugar they sold domestically. The
59. 41 Fed. Reg. 1,298 (1976).
60. 430 F. Supp. at 242.
61. Id. at 244.
62. Id. at 243.
63. Id. at 265.
64. 36.113 pounds avoirdupois. T.D. 22,814, 4 TRAS. DEc. 184 (1901).
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critical language of the Supreme Court's decision was straight-
foward:
[Tiwo facts . . .appear clearly . . . that no sugar is permit-
ted to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise tax of R. 1.75
per pood, and that sugar exported pays no tax at all. . . . When
a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon
all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever
manner, or under whatever name, it is disguised, it is a bounty
upon exportation."
The unequivocal language, taken literally, supports the
Custom Court's reading. However, it remains unclear whether
the Court in Downs condemned the mere excise remission or
whether the sugar certificate was the object of the countervail-
ing duty. The literal reading was cited in a subsequent (1903)
Board of General Appraisers (predecessor to the Customs
Court) decision and in a House Ways and Means Committee
document (1908) where it was understood to mean that an
excise remission on exported goods was a bounty.16 However,
the Secretary of the Treasury never interpreted Downs in that
fashion and subsequent determinations have consistently de-
nied that a tax remission on exports is always a bounty.
United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation (562 Fed. 2d 1209)
(1977)
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
in a case the majority called "first impression," would not ac-
cept the Customs Court's reading of Downs and reversed the
decision. The lower court's reading, said the majority opinion,
was to take the straightforward language of the Downs decision
out of the context of the facts-that there was a dual benefit
in the Russian remission-and-certificate scheme. The original
Board of General Appraiser's opinion had noted the combina-
tion of the two benefits. The Board and the appellate courts
were faced with a "decision resting not on either of two inde-
pendent grounds but on a single ground having at least two im-
portant elements.""8 Therefore, there was no need for the
court to decide whether a nonexcessive remission was a per se
65. 187 U.S. at 515.
66. 430 F. Supp. at 245.
67. Butler, supra note 7, at 120 n. 188. The Secretary interpreted the Downs case
as requiring a refund plus something else of cash value in order to trigger countervailing
duties.
68. 562 F. 2d at 1213.
1979
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bounty or grant. In the context of the entire opinion, then, the
strong language cited by the Customs Court was not necessary
to the decision and was not the ratio decidendi.6 1 Additional
findings of the majority included: (1) that Congress has not
required that every remission constitute a bounty, as demon-
strated by the refusal to define "bounty" or "grant" in the
statute; (2) that while legislative history can be cited for either
position, there is nothing to indicate a congressional intent
that countervailing duties be imposed in response to "non-
excessive remissions";" and (3) that a long-continued admin-
istrative practice is entitled to great weight, particularly when
Congress has failed to revise the statute while on notice of the
administrative practice."
That Congress has acquiesced to the administrative prac-
tices of the Treasury was, in the opinion of dissenting Judges
Miller and Baldwin, a myth. Moreover, (1) the case was not one
of first impression because the key language has been dealt
with by the Supreme Court before; (2) the interpretation of the
Court in Downs was holding, not dictum; and (3) judicial inter-
pretation prevails over any long-continued administrative
practice.7
As the Customs Court decision had done before, the dis-
senters zeroed in on the unequivocal language cited in Downs
but referred to by the majority as "unnecessary." To bolster
the argument that either the remission or the certificate would
classify as a bounty the dissenters quote the language in the
Downs decision referring to the export certificate as an
additional bounty:
If the additional bounty paid by Russia upon exported sugar were
the result of a higher protective tariff upon foreign sugar, and a
further enhancement of prices by a limitation on the amount of
free sugar put upon the market, we should regard the effect of
such regulations as being simply a bounty on production, al-
69. Id. at 1215.
70. Id. at 1217.
71. The government argued that if the Downs case held as Zenith claimed it did,
the Secretary's interpretation nevertheless emerged supreme. Because the Secretary
did not change his interpretation after either the Downs or Nicholas cases and because
Congress-with full knowledge of the Secretary's practice-continued to re-enact the
statute without substantive change, Congress in effect "overruled" Downs and
Nicholas insofar as they conflicted with the Secretary's practice. Reply Brief for Appel-
lant at 6-7, United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F. 2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
72. 562 F. 2d at 1223.
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though it might incidentally and remotely foster an increased
exportation of sugar; but where in addition to that these regula-
tions exempt sugar exported from excise taxation altogether, we
think it clearly falls within the definition of an indirect bounty
upon exportation.7 3 (Emphasis added.)
The dissenters concluded that both the remission and the
certificate were bounties. Also referred to is the definition pro-
vided by the Supreme Court itself in the 1919 countervailing
duty case Nicholas & Co. v. United States. There, bounties
were determined to have been granted on whiskey and gin ex-
ported from Great Britain and countervailing duties were as-
sessed. In interpreting the relevant statute the Court wrote:
If the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word "grant" has
not. A word of broader significance than "grant" could not have
been used. Like its synonyms "give" and "bestow" it expresses a
concession, the conferring of something by one person on another.
And if the "something" be conferred by a country "upon the
exportation of any article or merchandise" a countervailing duty
is required . ..
In the Nicholas case as well as other subsequent decisions7 5
the courts relied on the broad language used in Downs to justify
assessment of duties. Likewise, the majority in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals was mindful of the "subsequent
references to broad statements"76 made in Downs. Neverthe-
less, the majority was not swayed by this line of interpretation.
The court's decision left to the Secretary of the Treasury that
"lawfully permissible ' 7 discretion which the Secretary has
exercised since-and perhaps despite-the Downs decision.
Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States (98 S. Ct. 2441)
(1978)
The Supreme Court decision wholly embraced the think-
ing of the C.C.P.A. majority on the three contested issues: (1)
the correct interpretation of the statutory language and legisla-
tive history of section 303; (2) the Downs holding; and (3) the
economic effects of the remission of the Japanese tax. As the
Supreme Court's findings parallel those of the C.C.P.A. on
73. 187 U.S. at 513.
74. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. at 39.
75. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct.
1971), aff'd on other grounds 472 F. 2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
76. 562 F. 2d at 1215.
77. Id. at 1223.
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both law and policy, the lower court's decision is unanimously
affirmed.
The opinion of Justice Marshall clearly delineates two
principles that govern the Court's thinking. First, because of
the long-standing Treasury interpretation of the statute and
congressional "acquiescence" to this interpretation, the
C.C.P.A. had correctly affirmed the interpretation as "lawfully
permissible"" within the language of section 303. Second,
the Court found no rule emanating from Downs which explic-
itly decided the question whether "nonexcessive remission of
taxes, standing alone, would have constituted a bounty on
exportation."79 The Court went on to rule on a third issue, that
the Treasury's interpretation was "reasonable" in light of the-
"economic result" of the Japanese tax remission. Actually, as
petitioner Zenith had based its cause of action squarely on its
interpretation that Downs declared a tax remission, upon
exportation, as a per se bounty or grant, this third issue as to
the reasonableness or arbitrariness of the Treasury policy was
never put into contention."0 The fact that the Supreme Court
sought to identify it (as had the C.C.P.A.) as fundamental to
the resolution of the issue, shows that the decision also had
strong roots in economic policy.
Statutory Interpretation
The Court noted that the Treasury had adopted its inter-
pretation of the 1897 statute the following year and that that
interpretation has been both unchanged and consistent in ap-
plication since that time. Such a long-standing statutory inter-
pretation by an administrative agency is entitled to
"considerable weight." 2 That interpretation has "particular
weight" when the administrative practice involves a
''contemporaneous construction of a statute" by those
"charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in
motion. 83 Additionally, as the Department's interpretation
78. Id.
79. 98 S. Ct. at 2451.
80. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11 n. 9, Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
81. May 6, 1898 in T.D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of Decisions 696 (1898). See Brief for
the United States in Opposition at 6 n. 4.
82. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting Unemployment Compensa-
tion Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).
83. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933);
see, e.g., Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
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was "sufficiently reasonable," it was acceptable to a reviewing
court."4 In summary the Court finds:
Our examination of the language, the legislative history, and the
overall purpose of the 1897 provision persuades us that the De-
partment's initial construction of the statute was far from un-
reasonable; and we are unable to find anything in the events
subsequent to that time that convinces us that the Department
was required to abandon this interpretation .
5
Petitioner Zenith's claim that the statute is clear and unambi-
guous by a plain meaning approach to the language is implic-
itly rejected by the Court's broader view of the legislative activ-
ity that forged the statute.
Legislative History
The Marshall opinion zeroed in on two critical periods in
the murky legislative history of this act. The first target of
analysis concerned the subtle changes brought about when the
first act, an exclusively sugar-protecting provision in 1890, '
was expanded to cover general imports in 1897. While no defi-
nition of "bounty or grant" was provided by any of the mea-
sures as enacted, there is evidence that supporters7 of the mea-
sure intended to countervail only against "net" bounties
(where monies rebated upon export exceeded the domestic ex-
cise tax). Such subsidization schemes were then practiced by
"several" European governments. 8 This concept was more
explicitly covered in the 1894 Act which excepted American
importers from duties on bounty-fed exports where those im-
porters could produce a certificate from the exporting govern-
ment that "no indirect bounty has been received upon said
sugar in excess of the tax collected upon the beet or cane
84, Train v. Natural Resources Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975).
85. 98 S. Ct. at 2445.
86. Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 584.
87. Appellant U.S. Government maintained in its reply brief before the C.C.P.A.
that "Statements of sponsors are to be accorded substantial weight in the interpreta-
tion of a statute." Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
562 F. 2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The Government advanced a similar argument before
the Supreme Court. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11 n.8, Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978). This point was contested by Zenith, but
the Supreme Court did not address it in the opinion. Instead, the Court relied on
statements made by both sides in the floor debates insofar as both sides were in accord
as to the amounts of countervailing duties discussed. This obviated the need to rely
on the sponsor's intentions.
88. 98 S. Ct. at 2446.
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from which it was produced."'" (Emphasis added.) Although
the same provision was not incorporated into the 1897 Act,
the term "net amount of such bounty or grant" 0 was incor-
porated. By that phrase the concept of "net bounty" was
transposed from the 1894 to the 1897 Act, and in so doing the
intent was "to incorporate the prior rule that nonexcessive
remission of indirect taxes would not trigger the countervailing
requirement at all.""
Second, the Court studied the Senate floor debates sur-
rounding the passage of the 1897 Act. The Senate debate makes
clear the intention to countervail only against excess remis-
sions and provides an illustration of the concept through a
German export scheme then under scrutiny. The House version
of the 1897 Act had in fact utilized explicit language concerning
countervailing against only "net" bounties on exported sugar.
That language was deleted in the Senate (and final) version
because the Senate wished to expand the coverage of the act
to all imports, not merely sugar." The offending German
scheme concerned a "bounty" on exported raw and refined
sugar. The "bounty" figures used in the debates were 38t per
hundred pounds of refined sugar and 27t per hundred pounds
of raw sugar. Consequently, the countervailing duties under
discussion were in the same amounts. But the crucial fact re-
vealed in the debates was that the full amount remitted from
domestic consumption tax upon export from Germany was
$2.16 per hundred pounds. It follows from this discrepancy that
the figures of 38 and 27 cents must have been what the Treas-
ury had determined to be the "excess" or "net" bounty; other-
wise if remission of the entire indirect tax were regarded as the
"bounty," the necessary duty would have to have been the full
$2.16.11
Downs Revisited
Ultimately, the resolution to the Zenith case rests upon
the Downs decision. The Court acknowledges that "this would
be a very different case"9" if the Secretary's interpretation were
89. Paragraph 182 V2 of the Act of August 27, 1894. Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat.
521.
90. Section 5 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 205.
91. 98 S. Ct. at 2446.
92. 30 CONG. REc. 1635 (1897).
93. 98 S. Ct. at 2447.
94. Id. at 2449.
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contrary to the Court's holding in Downs.
The facts in that case revealed two relevant tax adjust-
ments: (1) the remission of excise taxes on sugar exported from
Russia, and (2) receipt of a valuable certificate upon export,
this certificate relieving the exporter of excise taxes on his
sugar sold domestically. The issue that came before the Downs
Court was whether a nonexcessive remission of indirect tax
together with the granting of an additional benefit (the certi-
ficate) constituted a "bounty or grant.' 5 Because petitioner
Downs, the importer, did not challenge the amount of the duty
assessed on the sugar by the Treasury, the Court's attention
was not concentrated on the distinction between the mere re-
mission of the tax and the certificate. Thus, Zenith arrived at
court arguing that a mere remission alone was sufficient to
trigger a countervailing duty. They bolstered their argument
with the same broad language used in Downs that had proven
persuasive in the Customs Court."
The modern Court finds this passage wholly incompatible
with language in Downs both preceding and subsequent to the
general language in Downs. The Downs Court understood the
"bounty" to refer to the certificates, as had the Board of
General Appraisers 7 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals"
before it. The Downs Court, equally concerned with the
"economic effect" of the disputed activity as the modem
Court, noted:
"The amount he [the exporter] receives for his export
certificate, say, R. 1.25, is the exact amount of the bounty he
receives upon exportation, and this enables him to sell at a
profit in a foreign market."" (Emphasis added.) Further, the
Downs Court went on to specifically concur with the conclusion
of the Fourth Circuit, which it incorporated verbatim into its
own opinion:
We find that the Russian exporter of sugar obtains from his gov-
ernment a certificate, solely because of such exportation, which
is worth in the open markets of that country from R. 1.25 to R.
1.64 per pood, or from 1.8 to 2.35 cents per pound. Therefore we
95. Id. at 2450.
96. See note 65 supra.
97. T.D. 22,984, 4 TnA~s. DEC. 405, 410-11,413 (1901).
98. Downs v. United States, 113 Fed. 144, 145.
99. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 515.
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hold that the government of Russia does secure to the exporter
of that country, as the inevitable result of its action, a money
reward or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia.N
The occurrence within the same page of the same opinion
of statements that have given rise to legal arguments for the
opposing sides in the Zenith case is what makes Downs an
"admittedly opaque opinion."''1 Nevertheless, the weight of
the evidence does not allow the modern Court to take the broad
statements relied upon by Zenith as the holding of the Downs
decision. Because no one argued in Downs that a mere remis-
sion by itself constituted a bounty, and because the Court did
in fact support the Secretary's decision countervailing only as
against the excess remission,102 the Court finds that "the iso-




Both petitioner Zenith and respondent U.S. Government
supported their legal points with economic and policy argu-
ments. The Court was much less definitive in its discussion of
these issues than in its clean-cut resolutions to the interpreta-
tion of the legislative history and the Downs holding. While the
Court did not deny the validity of Zenith's position, it did not
alter its affection for the reasonable nature of the Treasury
policy.
The main thrust of Zenith's economic argument was that
the Treasury policy is based on outdated economic theory
which favors foreign tax structures. The Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that remissions of indirect taxes may be in fact an
incentive to export.1'0 Additionally, such remissions as sanc-
tioned by GATT may work to the detriment of those countries
relying primarily on direct taxes (as the United States) and to
the advantage of those dependent on indirect taxes (as Japan).
Thus, where indirect taxes are a primary revenue source, for-
eign exporters "are able to receive tax rebates on exportation
far greater than U.S. exporters, without fear of countervailing
under either the GATT rules, or the countervailing duty law as
100. Id. at 516.
101. 98 S. Ct. at 2450.
102. T.D. 22,814, 4 TxAs. Dac. 184 (1901). The final sums assessed against the
Russian sugar ranged from .38 ruble per pood to .50 ruble per pood.
103. 98 S. Ct. at 2451.
104. Id. at 2449.
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it traditionally has been construed by the Treasury Depart-
ment."' 5 The possible competitive advantage gained by foreign
producers has been fully debated in Congress. Legislative dis-
satisfaction with present policy has resulted, inter alia, in some
protectionist language from the Senate Finance Committee'
6
and promulgation of Section 121(a) (5) of the Trade Act of 1974,
which mandates presidential action on a revision of GATT
articles "with respect to the treatment of border adjustments
for internal taxes to redress the disadvantages to countries
relying primarily on direct rather than indirect taxes."'
0 7
Although cognizant of the dissatisfaction, the Court bows to
the complexity of the economic situation and states that "given
the present state of economic knowledge" it would be difficult
to measure the effect of the remission of indirect taxes.0 8 Nor
does the Court think it wise to substitute its judgment for that
of the Secretary in economic matters.' Clearly the Court feels
the economics of the issue are too nebulous for judicial resolu-
tion and therefore does not defeat Zenith's arguments so much
as side-step them.
Economics aside, the Court feels the successful application
of the Treasury policy over eight decades has been reasonable.
That policy has sought to analyze a tax remission or other
subsidy in terms of its economic effect on the United States.
The policy is best encapsulated in the C.C.P.A. analysis:
"Neither form nor nomenclature being decisive in determining
whether a bounty or grant has been conferred, it is the eco-
nomic result of the foreign government's action which con-
trols."" 0 In fact, the analysis is a balancing test; measuring the
effect of the offending practice against the purpose of counter-
vailing duty legislation. Indeed the history of judicial review of
countervailing duty cases contains both of these themes."'
105. Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Non-tariff Distortions to Thade, 7 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 352 (1975).
106. "[T]he United States can no longer stand by and expose its markets, while
other nations shelter their economies . . . with . . . export subsidies . ; . and a host
of other practices which effectively discriminate against U.S. trade and production."
S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
107. Trade Act of 1974, § 121(a)(5), adding 19 U.S.C. § 2131. See generally, Marks
& Malmgren, supra note 105, at 354-355.
108. 98 S. Ct. at 2449.
109. Id.
110. 562 F.2d at 1216.
111. See, e.g., T.D. 22,984 at 414; and Downs, 187 U.S. at 514-515.
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The modern Court notes that while the legislative history
might not be such as to compel a Treasury policy against only
"net" bounties, there is no question of the reasonable nature
of the policy "in light of the statutory purpose.""' The statu-
tory purpose of countervailing duties is to control and negate
the competitive advantage gained through export subsidiza-
tion. In holding that nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes
did not sponsor the competitive advantage that the legislation
was enacted to prevent, the Treasury acted "in accordance
with the shared assumptions of the day as to the fairness and
economic effect of that practice." ' Thus the Secretary's pol-
icy, based on assumptions still current if not fully subscribed
to by all observers, remains as permissible today as it was in
1898.
The Future of Countervailing Duty Policy
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court decision is
twofold: (1) to lend judicial sanction to the "lawfully permissi-
ble" countervailing duties policy of the Treasury Department,
and (2) to distinguish Downs as not holding that all remissions
of indirect taxes are bounties or grants. While the latter result
would certainly deny future petitioners their strongest legal
precedent in cases with similar facts, it does not necessarily
follow that countervailing duty complaints will decrease. In-
deed, as the last decade has seen a marked increase in counter-
vailing duty reviews, there is the strong likelihood that the
combination of economic pressures and the increased accessi-
bility of the courts will result in a commensurate upsurge in
litigated complaints. This trend may focus needed light on
the Treasury's review procedures, which have often been
criticized for delay and secrecy.
The Zenith case was a pointed illustration of agency foot-
dragging. Eight years elapsed between the filing of Zenith's
complaint and the rendering of the Supreme Court decision;
nearly six years was spent in administrative investigation and
review. Fortunately, Congress addressed that situation directly
in the Trade Act of 1974 while Zenith was still under review.
The Secretary of the Treasury is now obligated to decide if a
112. 98 S. Ct. at 2448.
113. Id.
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foreign country has bestowed a bounty or grant within twelve
months of the filing of a complaint."'
Certain to come under renewed scrutiny is the wide range
of Treasury discretion, uninhibited by the need to produce a
factual record to justify bounty or no-bounty determinations.
As it stands today, when the Treasury imposes or denies a
countervailing duty claim, only the fact of the bounty or grant
is published along with the amount assessed against it, if any.
As noted by the C.C.P.A., this profoundly circumscribes judi-
cial review as there are no transcripts from which a reviewing
court can determine whether the Secretary's findings were sup-
ported by the evidence or if they were in fact arbitrary or capri-
cious. The Administrative Procedure Act"5 allows for such a
review and Congress does provide for hearings in antidumping
cases,"' but in countervailing duty review the Treasury is not
reached by either."7 This deficiency leads to the incongruous
situation faced by the C.C.P.A. in the Zenith case where it
acknowledged, on the one hand, that it is the economic effects
of a foreign government's action that determine whether a
subsidy has been bestowed, and on the other hand, that in the
Zenith case "the record is silent regarding the economic result
of the mere remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax.""' This
says, in effect, that the court maintains a standard of judgment
but receives no facts to apply to the standard. In the Zenith
case, the C.C.P.A. presumed"9 that the economic result of the
Japanese tax did not confer a subsidy, and then went on to
decide whether the Treasury policy was justifiable as a matter
of law. Faced with the same lack of data, the Supreme Court
merely notes that the debate over the economic effects of remit-
ted indirect taxes is far from over, 20 and faced with the com-
plexity of the issues it is "not the task of the judiciary to substi-
tute its views as to fairness and economic effect for those of the
Secretary."'' It would seem improbable that this "it's-fair-
because-the-Secretary-says-it's-fair" reasoning will stand
114. Trade Act of 1974 § 331(a), adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (1976).
116. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1976).
117. 562 F.2d at 1216, n.13.
118. Id. at 1216.
119. Id.
120. 98 S. Ct. at 2449.
121. Id.
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without challenge. Such a challenge would likely emerge in the
situation where a complainant wished to contest the data
which forms the basis of the final judgment whether a remis-
sion was "excessive" or not.
From the point of view of a prospective litigator, Zenith
provides little guidance to the standard of what constitutes a
bounty or grant. True, this very definition is a major policy
decision and should be the responsibility of congressional leg-
islation and executive (Treasury) interpretation and applica-
tion. However, as Congress has avoided a fixed definition,
and the facts and pleadings of the Zenith decision are hazy as
to how the Treasury determinations are made, it would follow
that it is the responsibility of the courts to provide some stan-
dards against which the petitioner can measure his chances for
successful review.
On the other hand, it can be strongly argued that the effect
of an arbitrary standard defined by statute would be detrimen-
tal to U.S. trading flexibility. This line of reasoning would
allow the Treasury the widest discretion possible in its determi-
nations so as to strike a better balance between the changing
economics and politics of international trade and U.S. inter-
ests. The judicial support that the Zenith decision lends to the
Treasury's practices has at its base a very compelling policy
rationale. The entire countervailing duties area is undermined
by a haunting specter, which like the Treasury policy is a leg-
acy of 1898-the fear of economic retaliation leading to a pro-
tective tariff war.
Because the imposition of countervailing duties is required
by the statute upon a finding of a bounty or grant; because
there need be no factual showing of "injury" to a domestic
industry; and because judicial review is subject to the afore-
mentioned limitations, some would view the imposition of
countervailing duties as a "sleeping giant"'' 22 with a dangerous
potential to disrupt the flow of world trade. In a 1971 counter-
vailing duties case the C.C.P.A. cautioned: "Countervailing
duties are strong medicine, well calculated to arouse violent
resentment in countries whose trade practices are branded by
122. Davis, The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1428,
1446 (1966).
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the court as unethical.' 23 The desire to avoid incitement of
"violent resentment" from one of America's foremost trading
partners is the overriding theme of the government's policy
arguments in Zenith. In its brief before the Supreme Court, the
government urged the Court to view the facts and policies in
the same light as the Secretary in order to avoid a "significant
breakdown" in American trading relations and "retaliatory
actions" from trading partners. It also pleaded for favorable
review so as not to undermine the government's "negotiating
flexibility" in the 1978 Multilateral Trade Negotiations (under
the auspices of the GATT).124 Additionally, any decision which
would encourage a wider application of countervailing duties
(in response to a worsening balance of payments deficit or im-
port glut) as has been predicted" 5 would certainly be contrary
to the spirit and language of GATT and likely put a severe
strain upon that system. 2 ' There is a strong inference to be
drawn from the decision in the Zenith case that a factor in the
Court's approval of the Treasury practice was the Secretary's
restraint in applying the duties pursuant to the congressional
grant of the discretion to determine what constitutes a bounty
or grant. It is for this reason that "bounty" or "grant" have no
statutory definition, indicating Congress' intent to refrain
"from calling all the countervailing duty plays in advance."'
Conclusion
In refusing to grant Zenith's request for reversal of a nega-
tive determination on Japanese electronic goods, the Supreme
Court has established two significant guidelines. Future com-
plainants who contest a no-bounty determination will no longer
have the broad language of the Downs decision to cite as pre-
cedent. Also, potential litigators are on notice that the Treas-
ury policy that refuses to assess duties against nonexcessive
remissions has been given full approval by a unanimous Court.
What remains to be clarified is a Treasury standard for
"bounty" or "grant" which is sufficiently well-defined to pro-
123. United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
124. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 7-8, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
125. King, supra note 40, at 1192.
126. Rosendahl, supra note 53, at 122.
127. 562 F.2d at 1217.
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vide guidance for potential complainants as well as to review-
ing courts.
Most significant in Zenith is the lack of evidence in the
language of the statute, or in eighty years of legislative history,
judicial review, and administrative practice, that could con-
vince the Court that the broad powers of countervailing duty
determinations should not be left to Treasury discretion.
Holding that the Treasury policy is "lawfully permissible"
under the statute is little more than saying that this discre-
tionary power has been reasonably exercised. The Congress,
long aware of the Treasury practices, has made no effort to
overrule them. The Treasury practice is also compatible with
the GATT system. The Zenith decision merely adds the
judicial imprimatur to the Treasury policy.
In so doing, the Court puts the countervailing duties prob-
lem in a broad international perspective. Countervailing duties
come to us from the late 19th century, a time when protective
tariffs were commonplace and retaliatory legislation was the
first response called for by U.S. industries, particularly a nas-
cent one as was the sugar industry at the turn of the century.
Similarly, massive imports of highly competitive Japanese con-
sumer electronic goods had the U.S. industry reeling in the
early 1970's. Continuing problems of a similar nature require
constant bilateral negotiations at the highest executive level
between the United States and Japan. The Zenith decision,
more than just another comment on Downs, lends judicial
backing to the Secretary's attempts to balance the anger of
domestic industry against the export necessities of a major
trading partner and ally. The Court's decision minimizes the
effect an arbitrary standard might have on world trade and
continues the discretionary license the Treasury has exercised
since the creation of the statute.
VOL. 8:487
